Despite concerns that the accuracy of pre-election telephone polls would be harmed by the omission of voters who could be reached only by cell phone, most national polls performed well in predicting President George W. Bush's reelection, and state polls were generally accurate as well. The national exit poll conducted by the National Election Pool found that 7% of electionday voters had cell phone service but no land line; younger voters were far more likely to be cellonly: 19% among those 18-24 and 20% among those 25-29. Within these two youngest age cohorts, cell-only voters were significantly more likely to be single and childless. While cellonly voters were more supportive of John Kerry than voters overall, they were similar to voters within their own age cohort. Because of this, pre-election telephone surveys that weighted their data appropriately by age were not significantly biased by the absence of the cell-only voters.
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Among the many challenges faced by polling organizations in the 2004 elections, the newest and perhaps most frequently discussed was the growing number of people who relied solely on a cell phone for telephone service. Cell-phone-only (CPO) households could not be reached by most pollsters because major survey organizations do not include cell phone numbers in their telephone sampling frames for political polls. Given the fact that CPO households disproportionately include younger citizens, considerable speculation arose that their omission would create a bias in pre-election polls. Many believed that the polls might understate John Kerry's support, given his greater popularity among younger voters. 1 The potential danger of CPO households for the polls was discussed in at least 150 separate news stories in major newspapers, news magazines, or the broadcast media during the four weeks prior to the election. (where the average of the polls was a Bush lead of +0.6% and he actually won by 5%). 3 The mean of polls within states showed no consistent bias in favor of either candidate, relative to the actual outcome.
No reliable national political polls of cell phone users were taken during the campaign and so we cannot know how these voters were reacting to the campaign and how they intended to vote. But because the National Election Pool (the organization created by the major television networks and the Associated Press to collect data on Election Day) included a question about telephone status on the national exit poll, we have evidence about the size, demographic composition, attitudes, and voting behavior of people in CPO households who voted in person on Election Day.
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The NEP Telephone Status Measure
On two of its four forms of the national exit poll questionnaire, the NEP included a single question asking respondents about the availability of telephone service in their home. A total of 5,619 voters responded to the question.
[ Table 1 about here]
The NEP survey committee recognized the difficulty of measuring telephone service with a single question; the Current Population Survey uses a series of approximately 16 questions for this purpose. And owing to the lateness of the decision to include the question, there was no time for cognitive assessments or pre-testing of the question. Among the many concerns was the possibility that some voters may not have understood the difference between cellular telephones 4 The NEP exit poll is conducted with voters leaving polling places in a stratified probability sample of precincts across the U.S., and is supplemented with a telephone survey of voters who voted absentee or through early voting. The completion rate for the election-day exit survey is 52.8%. As described in the methods statement of NEP, "the respondents are weighted based on two factors. They are (1) the probability of selection of the precinct and the respondent within the precinct; (2) by the size and distribution of the best estimate of the vote within geographic sub-regions of the nation." The weighting incorporates an age-sex-race non-response adjustment. (Blumberg et al., 2005) .
Prevalence and Demographic Characteristics of CPOs
According to the exit poll, voters in CPO households differ in important ways demographically from voters who have landlines. They are younger, more likely to be unmarried, and less likely to have children. The BLS and NHIS surveys also find that they are significantly more likely to be renters. Table 2 shows the prevalence of CPO voters across different demographic groups in the sample.
[ Table 2 about here]
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About one-in-five voters under the age of 30 were CPO (19% among those 18-24 and 20% among those 25-29). CPO voter incidence drops off to only 7% (the average for all voters) among those in their 30s, and is 4% or less among those 40 and older. The relationship between CPO voter status and education and income is relatively modest, with somewhat greater incidence among the less educated and less affluent. Men were only slightly more likely than women to be CPO (8% vs. 6%, not significant), and differences by race were similarly small and non-significant (9% of Hispanics, vs. 7% each for blacks and whites). These patterns demonstrate that CPO household status is heavily influenced by life cycle phenomena. Within the current telephony environment, CPO status is especially appealing to younger, single voters without children. The data indicate that for younger voters (and 5 presumably for all younger people) getting married or having children results in a much lower probability of living in a CPO household.
Presidential Vote and Cell Phone Status
As predicted by many observers prior to the election, significantly more CPO voters supported John Kerry than George W. Bush. According to the exit poll, CPO voters voted 54%
for Kerry and 45% for Bush, compared with an overall 51%-48% margin in favor of Bush among the entire electorate. The difference between landline and CPO voters in support for Bush is significant at the .10 level. Not surprisingly given their lower levels of income, the relatively small number of voters with no telephone service were even more supportive of Kerry (he won among this group by 59% to 40%), but he also carried the somewhat larger group of voters who reported only a landline (52% Kerry, 48% Bush, not shown). But seven-in-ten voters had both a cell phone and a landline, and Bush had a 53% to 47% advantage among this group, offsetting Kerry's lead among the other groups.
[ Table 3 about here]
Given the advantage that Kerry held among CPO voters and those with no telephone service, how did the pre-election polls do as well as they did in forecasting the vote? The answer is twofold. First, the absolute number of voters unreachable by conventional landline RDD telephone polls was relatively small (just 9% of all voters), and though different from voters with landlines, they were not different enough to seriously bias the estimates of RDD surveys. Taking the exit poll and simply excluding CPO and no-phone voters simulates the electorate that was available to RDD surveys. 5 Even in this group, Bush's lead was only 1.3 percentage points larger than in the electorate as a whole: 3.7 points compared with the 2.4 points by which he actually won the election. In a closer election, such a bias could lead to an inaccurate prediction of the outcome, but for any given poll in such a close race, neither candidate could be said to be ahead by a statistically significant amount.
A second reason that CPO voters (and non-phone voters) did not create serious biases in pre-election polls is that while CPO voters were more supportive of Kerry than the electorate as a whole, they were more similar to all voters within their age cohorts, especially among the younger groups where the incidence of CPO voters was the greatest. Among all voters age 18-29, Kerry led Bush by 56% to 42%. Among CPO voters, the margin was 58% to 41%. These differences were not statistically significant. The upshot of this pattern is that while approximately one-fifth of young voters were inaccessible to RDD surveys because of their CPO status, their exclusion resulted in very little bias in RDD surveys that used post-stratification weighting to ensure that this age group was appropriately represented in the sample. In other words, surveys that weighted their unscreened RDD sample (prior to reductions in the sample based on voter registration and likely voter status) to national parameters would have typically increased the weight of the younger RDD respondents in order to compensate for the missing one-fifth of this age group who could not be reached on a landline 6 ; since the CPO voters were very similar to those with landlines, this weighting adjustment eliminated most of the bias that could occur from the under-representation of younger, more liberal voters. Weighting that accounted separately for ages 18-24 and those slightly older might improve the quality of the estimates because the Democratic advantage was greater for the younger group. 7 An important assumption underlying this assertion is that the likelihood of younger citizens turning out to vote was similar for CPOs and those with landlines. If CPOs were more likely to vote, the post-stratification adjustment would lead to an understatement of the size of the youth cohort among voters (though the magnitude of this bias would likely be modest). Alternatively, if CPOs were less likely to vote, the adjustment would lead to an overestimate of how many young people would vote.
Beyond the Vote: Party Identification, Ideology, and Attitudes
While the vote is the most important concern of pre-election pollsters, the omission of CPO households from any public opinion survey conducted with random digit dialing has the potential to produce a biased result in terms of other kinds of politically relevant attitudes and behaviors. Since the exit poll is by definition a survey of voters, we are limited to some extent in the breadth of generalizations we can make. For example, voters are typically more engaged in political life, more likely to participate in other ways, more apt of have opinions on important questions of the day, and more likely to have well constrained attitudes. But among voters, we can see the extent to which phone status is related to partisanship, liberal-conservative ideology, opinions on certain issues, and the importance of certain issues in the vote choice.
[ Table 4 about here]
As with the presidential vote, CPO voters appear somewhat different from all voters and those reachable by landlines. In the exit poll they are less Republican in partisan identification, more liberal, more likely to cite economic conditions as an important reason for their vote (both differences are significant at the .05 level), but very similar in terms of approval of the decision to go to war in Iraq. And as with presidential vote, most of these differences are associated with the demographics underlying telephone status, and most can be mitigated in RDD surveys through demographic weighting.
Conclusions
Despite concerns that the omission of CPO households from pre-election polls would produce biases in the estimates, the pre-election polls conducted by telephone performed But the analysis presented here suggests that the danger presented by CPO households to political polling remains relatively modest. It should be remembered that even among the young, unmarried, and highly mobile voter, the CPO household is not the norm. Moreover, while CPO status has great appeal to young and mobile people, these CPO voters thus far appear to be only slightly more liberal or Democratic in their orientation than others of their age and social characteristics. And marriage and parenthood bring a significantly higher likelihood of having a landline, even if a cell phone is retained. A reasonable inference from this fact is that people still believe a landline phone has important benefits -perhaps higher audio quality (especially where cell phone service is spotty), a single number for others to reach the household, access to dial-up 9 or DSL internet service, free incoming calls, reliable 911 service, and a central and reliable telephone for all households members to use. Until the telephone environment changes in ways that eliminate these advantages for the landline, the potential for the growth of CPO households may be limited. Consequently, the near-term threat to RDD election surveys posed by CPO households may also be modest except where the population of interest is young voters. 
